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Eight Nails into Katz’s Coffin* 
Amitai Etzioni† 
Abstract 
From a social science viewpoint, that the United States courts 
keep drawing on Katz v. United States1 in their rulings about whether 
or not privacy has been violated is difficult to comprehend. This legal 
case is clearly based on untenable sociological and psychological 
assumptions. Moreover, many fine legal scholars have laid out 
additional strong reasons that establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that it is unreasonable to draw on “the reasonable expectations of 
privacy” as a legal concept. Continuing to draw on this concept, 
especially in the cyber age, undermines the legitimacy of the courts 
and hence of the law. This Article reviews these arguments in order to 
further nail down the lid on Katz’s coffin so that this case—and the 
privacy doctrine that draws on it—will be allowed to rest in peace. 
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I. Katz Is Tautological 
The Fourth Amendment “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
standard is tautological and circular. Both the individual and the 
societal expectations of privacy depend on judicial rulings—while 
judges, in turn, use these expectations as the basis for their rulings. 
Mr. Katz had no reason to assume a conversation he conducted in a 
public phone booth would be considered private or not—until the 
 
* I am indebted to Rory Donnelly for research assistance on this Article.  
† University Professor and Director of the Institute for Communitarian 
Policy Studies at The George Washington University; Ph.D. in Sociology 
from the University of California Berkeley; former President of the 
American Sociological Association; and founder of the Communitarian 
Network. 
1.     389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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court ruled that he had such an expectation.2 In other words, when 
the court holds that it heeds the vox populi, it actually follows the 
echo of its own voice. Several leading legal scholars find Katz’s 
tautological nature highly problematic. Richard Posner, for example, 
notes that “it is circular to say that there is no invasion of privacy 
unless the individual whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; whether he will or will not have such an 
expectation will depend on what the legal rule is.”3 Richard A. 
Epstein maintains this:  
It is all too easy to say that one is entitled to privacy because 
one has the expectation of getting it. But the focus on the 
subjective expectations of one party to a transaction does not 
explain or justify any legal rule, given the evident danger of 
circularity in reasoning.4  
Anthony G. Amsterdam points out that the “actual, subjective 
expectation of privacy . . . can neither add to, nor can its absence 
detract from, an individual’s claim to fourth amendment protection.”5 
As Professor Amesterdam notes, “the government could diminish each 
person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-
hourly on television that . . . we were all forthwith being placed under 
comprehensive electronic surveillance.”6 
Jed Rubenfeld adds wisely that if expectations of privacy are 
“tied to what a citizen ought to know about the [law], Fourth 
Amendment law becomes a self-validating logical circle in 
which . . . any judicial decision will vindicate reasonable expectations 
of privacy (because the judicial decision will itself warrant the 
expectations or lack of expectations it announces).”7 By this logic, he 
concludes, a totalitarian society with government informants in every 
workplace and household would satisfy the current interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment.8 
Richard Seamon extends this criticism, arguing that a “reasonable 
expectations” test that concludes certain government privacy 
intrusions do not count as searches “for Fourth Amendment  
2. Id. at 351–53. 
3. Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme 
Court, 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 173, 188. 
4. Richard A. Epstein, Principles for a Free Society: Reconciling 
Individual Liberty with the Common Good 210 (1998). 
5. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
Minn. L. Rev. 349, 384 (1974). 
6. Id. 
7. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 101, 115 (2008). 
8. Id. at 134. 
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purposes” is “not just circular” but causes a “downward spiral” in 
which restrictions on searches and seizures are reduced over time by 
virtue of the Court’s semantics, thereby undermining the “purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches.”9 
According to Seamon, the reasoning used by the Court in Kyllo v. 
United States10 demonstrates that the justices are aware of and 
struggling to deal with this dilemma.11 The majority admitted that 
“[t]he Katz test—whether the individual has an expectation of privacy 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable—has often been 
criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”12  
It is difficult to comprehend why the well-established observation 
that Katz is tautological is not itself sufficient to lay Katz to rest. 
Nevertheless, this Article provides several other reasons for ending the 
Katz standard. 
II. Katz Is Subject to Institutional Influence 
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard is not only highly 
malleable by the courts but also is subject to influence by various 
institutions. Statements made by elected officials, especially the 
President; laws enacted by Congress; and normative positions 
developed by religious authorities and public intellectuals all affect 
what people consider private or an open book. 
Along these lines, Shaun Spencer points out that the 
“expectation-driven conception of privacy” facilitates the erosion of 
privacy overall by “large institutional actors.”13 That is because 
powerful institutions can influence the social practices that affect the 
expectations of privacy “by changing their own conduct or practices, 
by changing or designing technology to affect privacy, or by 
 
9. Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance 
of Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1013, 1023–
24 (2001). 
10. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
11. See Seamon, supra note 9, at 1023 (“I believe that the Kyllo majority 
avoided the Katz test to avoid the [circular] problem that is so well 
illustrated by its application to the facts of Kyllo.”). 
12. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (emphasis added). 
13. Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 
39 San Diego L. Rev. 843, 844 (2002); see also Marissa A. Lalli, Note, 
Spicy Little Conversations: Technology in the Workplace and a Call for 
a New Cross-Doctrinal Jurisprudence, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 243, 245 
(2011) (arguing that given the “growing popularity of employer-provided 
personal communication devices” of ambiguous shared ownership 
between employee and employer, the “expectation of privacy” standard 
undermines the protection of individuals from unreasonable search and 
seizure by institutions). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
Eight Nails into Katz’s Coffin 
416 
implementing laws that affect society’s expectation of privacy.”14 
When employers monitor their employees’ computer use, for example, 
they “diminish the expectation of privacy in the workplace,” and 
when “merchants routinely sell consumers’ personal data, they 
diminish the expectation of privacy in one’s transactional informa-
tion.”15 
Jed Rubenfeld shows that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test would allow a simple government announcement that “all 
telephone calls will henceforth be monitored” to deprive people of 
their “reasonable expectations of privacy in such calls,” retroactively 
justifying the decree.16 Put simply by Erwin Chemerinsky, the 
government “seemingly can deny privacy just by letting people know 
in advance not to expect any.”17 Richard Julie adds importantly that 
the ability of legislation and regulation to affect the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment in this way violates “the core principle of 
constitutional law, that the legislature may not alter the Constitution 
by an ordinary statute.”18  
Thus, the public’s “reasonable expectations” may be altered by 
any number of factors. The fact that the vox populi is affected not 
only by the courts but also by myriad other institutions hardly makes 
it a more reliable, trustworthy or independent criterion for determin-
ing a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
III. Surveys to the Rescue?  
Assuming judges try to live up to the standard they have set and 
seek to figure out what reasonable people consider private beyond 
looking into their own innards, to whom should they turn? There are 
more than three hundred million Americans. Even if one excludes 
minors and others whose opinion, for one reason or another, the law 
excludes, a very hefty number remains. There is no reason, and even 
less evidence, to hold that they all will have the same expectations.  
 
14. Spencer, supra note 13, at 860. 
15. Id. 
16. Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 132–33. 
17. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 
Brandeis L.J. 643, 650 (2007); see also Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and 
“Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1081, 1089 (2008) (arguing that “immigrants have become 
so regulated that any Katz expectation of privacy [for immigrants] to 
occupy spaces in silence without detection becomes unreasonable”). 
18. Richard S. Julie, Note, High-Tech Surveillance Tools and the Fourth 
Amendment: Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Technological 
Age, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 127, 132 (2000) (citing Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). 
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Some have suggested that using opinion surveys could make the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test less circular and subjective by 
actually finding out what people believe.19 Christopher Slobogin and 
Joseph Schumacher, for example, have suggested that the Supreme 
Court should factor empirical sources such as opinion surveys into the 
Katz test.20 Henry Fradella et al. likewise hold that survey data would 
provide “a far richer and more accurate” basis for determining 
whether an expectation of privacy is “objectively reasonable.”21  
Actually, social scientists tend to agree that such surveys may not 
provide a reliable and appropriate tool on which the courts can rely. 
Survey results vary depending on (a) who is surveyed, (b) the ways 
the questions are worded, (c) the sequence in which the questions are 
asked, (d) the context in which they are asked (e.g., at home versus 
at work), and (e) the attributes of those who ask the questions. Even 
when the same question is asked of the same people by the same 
people twice, rather different answers can follow.22 These inherent 
problems are magnified when one seeks opinions about complicated, 
abstract issues like “privacy” and “surveillance.”23  
People tend to give answers they believe are expected of them, 
especially regarding issues that are politically or ideologically divisive. 
Respondents tend to exaggerate their income, popularity, happiness, 
and political engagement.24 Merely changing the phrasing of a  
19. This view relies in part on Justice Rehnquist’s statement that 
“[l]egitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source 
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of 
real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized 
and permitted by society.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 
(1978). Empirical data would be used to shed light on the latter. 
20. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations 
of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical 
Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 
Duke L.J. 727, 757–58 (1993).  
21. Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring 
“Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment 
Context, 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 289, 294 (2011). 
22. See Inst. for Statistics Educ., Glossary of Statistical Terms: Test-Retest 
Reliability, Statistics.com, http://www.statistics.com/glossary&term_
id=867 (last visited Oct. 22, 2014) (discussing the concept of test-retest 
reliability in surveys). 
23. See, e.g., Oscar H. Gandy Jr., Public Opinion Surveys and the 
Formation of Privacy Policy, 59 J. Soc. Issues 283, 284 (2003) 
(explaining that the difficulty of framing neutral questions is “especially 
problematic in the realm of privacy policy”); Susan Freiwald, First 
Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 3, 
¶ 23 (stating that questions on privacy might be “too complicated and 
too easily skewed” to give accurate results). 
24. See Ruut Veenhoven, Why Social Policy Needs Subjective Indicators, 58 
Soc. Indicators Res. 33, 40 (2002) (“[R]esponses may be distorted in 
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question yields rather different results. A 2003 poll, for example, 
found that a strong majority (68%) of Americans favored invading 
Iraq, but this number fell to a minority (43%) if the possibility of U.S. 
military casualties was mentioned in the question.25 Along the same 
lines, a medical study found that patients were almost twice as likely 
to reject surgery when the predicted outcome was phrased in terms of 
“mortality rate” rather than “survival rate.”26 These issues present 
formidable obstacles to determining what the American people 
actually expect.27 Although social scientists have developed ways to 
mitigate these issues,28 the technological transition from landlines to 
 
a systematic way, such as by a tendency for respondents to conform to 
social desirability.”). 
25. Question Wording, Pew Res. Center for the People & the Press, 
http://www.people-press.org/methodology/questionnaire-design/ 
question-wording/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2014). Examples of such bias 
include “social desirability bias,” in which people give “inaccurate 
answers to questions that deal with sensitive subjects” like drug use or 
church attendance, especially in face-to-face interviews; “acquiescence 
bias,” illustrated by a poll that found when people were asked whether 
military strength was the best way to secure peace, 55 percent were in 
favor when phrased as a “yes or no” question, but only 33 percent were 
in favor when “diplomacy” was offered as an alternative; and question 
order effects, demonstrated by a 2008 poll that found that an additional 
10 percent of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with current affairs if 
they were previously, rather than subsequently, asked if they approved 
of the President’s performance. Id. See also Andrew R. Binder et al., 
Measuring Risk/Benefit Perceptions of Emerging Technologies and 
Their Potential Impact on Communication of Public Opinion Toward 
Science, 21 Pub. Understanding Sci. 830, 832–33 (2012) (suggesting 
that short opinion polls may yield different results than longer academic 
surveys).  
26. Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for 
Alternative Therapies, 306 New Eng. J. Med. 1259, 1261 (1982). 
27. The archetypal example of survey error leading to false results was the 
famous “Literary Digest poll” that falsely predicted Roosevelt’s loss of 
the 1936 presidential election results by relying solely on telephone and 
car owners, a disproportionately Republican group. See also Elizabeth 
Mehren, The War Over Love Heats Up Again: Author Shere Hite’s 
Third Report on Sexuality Fuels an Old Debate Over Her Methodology,  
L.A. Times, Oct. 29, 1987 (discussing that while a 1987 mail-in survey 
on love found that 98% of women were unhappy in their relationships, a 
telephone poll found that 93% were happy, and suggesting this was 
possibly because the unhappy had more motivation to mail in their 
responses); Russell D. Renka, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of 
Public Opinion Polls (Feb. 22, 2010), available at http:// cstl-
cla.semo.edu/rdrenka/Renka_papers/polls.htm (discussing the idea that 
Internet polls, which tend to attract an unrepresentative sample of the 
population and to lack safeguards against multiple voting, can be 
particularly susceptible to these types of errors). 
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cell phones and e-mail, coupled with the declining response rate to 
polls, has made accurate polling increasingly difficult.29 
Particularly problematic is defining which “society” the Court has 
in mind when it seeks to determine the societal expectation of 
privacy.30 Simply put, whose reasonable expectation matters? Katz’s 
peers? The members of his gambling community? Or the people of the 
United States of America? 
IV. Expectation or Right? 
Drawing on the societal expectation of privacy in effect amounts 
to drawing on consensus. This raises a preliminary question: how 
much agreement is needed to qualify as “societal” expectation? Total 
consensus is not found in any society of complexity, even in ones 
much smaller than the United States. Is an 80 percent agreement 
enough? A two-thirds majority?  
Much more important is the question of whether the courts 
should be guided by consensus even when it can be accurately 
determined. True, consensus has a prudential value. The courts 
should not stray too far from public consensus, lest they lose their 
legitimacy or stray into a bitter culture war of the kind that occurred 
around reproductive rights (i.e., decisional privacy). However, 
consensus has no standing from a normative viewpoint when 
fundamental rights are at stake. Thus, if an overwhelming majority of 
Americans agrees that women are second-class citizens or that 
“fishing expeditions” by the police are fully acceptable because “those 
who did nothing wrong have nothing to hide,” this does not mean 
that a court should accept this consensus and allow it to trump the 
court’s judgment as to what the Constitution entails and what is just 
and right. In short, from a normative viewpoint, the expectation of 
the public as to what and who may or may not be searched should 
matter little. 
Because this point is crucial, an elaboration follows. Katz runs 
roughshod over the elementary but essential fact that the political 
system of the United States is not a simple democracy but a liberal 
democracy.31 The essence of this regime is that it combines two very 
distinct principles. The first is majoritarianism: when we differ, we 
choose our course based on which position garners more votes. The 
 
28. See, e.g., Floyd J. Fowler Jr., Survey Research Methods 49–55 
(5th ed. 2014).    
29. Jason Zengerle, The. Polls. Have. Stopped. Making. Any. Sense., N.Y. 
Mag., Sept. 30, 2012; Thomas Fitzgerald, Rethinking Public Opinion, 
New Atlantis, Summer 2008, at 45, 60. 
30. Spencer, supra note 13, at 847–51.  
31. Others call it a “republic”; I would prefer a “constitutional democracy.”  
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second is liberalism: a set of rights are deliberately ensconced in the 
Constitution, making them so difficult to amend that one should 
usually take them as a given. To put it differently, the majority can 
decide what it prefers as long as this preference does not entail 
violating anybody’s rights to speak freely, to worship, to assemble, to 
petition, and so on. The right to privacy is one of these rights. 
Therefore, if the courts were to decide whether a particular situation 
is covered by the right to privacy based on what the masses told a 
pollster or what the courts somehow determine the societal view to 
be—the courts would in effect turn a fundamental right into a mass-
driven, pliable, ephemeral, ever-changing concept.  
Thus, Americans showed very little concern for privacy in the 
months that followed the September 11th attacks on America and 
much more concern when no new major attacks took place over the 
next ten years.32 They are sure to change their collective mind one 
more time if another attack occurs. If one bases a constitutional right 
on such a foundation, one might as well tie it to a weather vane. In 
short, if Katz is allowed to stand and the courts continue to follow it, 
the result would be to reduce the right of privacy at best to a mere 
matter of democratic majority rule.  
I write “at best” because Katz is not more aligned with the 
democratic half of the United States regime than it is with the 
liberal/constitutional half. In deciding those public policy issues that 
are not covered by rights and are subject to majority rule, the United 
States counts noses. That is, each person has a vote—whether or not 
they are reasonable. Katz is decided without any actual votes by the 
public; the people’s views are merely divined.  
In short, Katz is either a convenient fiction or a serious violation 
of the most basic principles of our polity and should be allowed to 
expire, the sooner the better.  
V. Two Prongs Offer Less Protection Than One  
Originally, the Katz test consisted of two “prongs” used jointly to 
determine whether a “reasonable expectation of privacy” existed.33 In 
the words of Justice Harlan, “[T]here is a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”34 Of course, such a dual 
standard raises this question: what is a court to do when the two 
standards are in conflict? If the courts ignore the first standard on the 
 
32. Amitai Etzioni, How Patriotic Is the Patriot Act?: Freedom 
Versus Security in the Age of Terrorism 14 (2004). 
33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).   
34. Id.    
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grounds that every defendant will claim an expectation of privacy in 
the matter at hand—why introduce two prongs in the first place? In 
practice, courts have increasingly ignored the first prong as a 
“practical matter,” for “defendants virtually always claim to have a 
subjective expectation of privacy” and such claims are difficult to 
disprove.35 Thus, David Cunis notes that “[t]he Court in [California 
v.] Greenwood, as in [California v.] Ciraolo, Oliver [v. United States], 
and [Maryland v.] Smith . . . summarily dismissed the first prong of 
the Katz test.”36 Thus, the expectation of privacy test relies almost 
exclusively on an objective determination of society’s “reasonable” 
expectations. Among all Katz’s flaws, this two-pronged approach is a 
relatively minor one; it merely adds one more reason to allow this 
legal concept to fade away. After all, if half the prongs of the Katz 
test are irrelevant, there is no compelling reason to continue following 
it. 
VI. Katz Is Confronted by the Cyber Age 
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard is further 
undermined by recent technological developments. The rise of social 
media, Facebook in particular, is a prime example of this trend. 
Originally intended and promoted as a social networking tool for 
college students, Facebook’s privacy implications have expanded in 
line with its broadening user base and functionality. There are 
numerous documented instances of employees being fired over 
material they, not expecting to share it with their employer, had 
posted on Facebook.37 A 2012 survey found that more than a third of 
employers use Facebook and similar sites to screen candidates,38 while 
70 percent of business managers admitted ruling out candidates based 
 
35. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U.        
Chi. L. Rev. 919, 933 n.35 (2005) (discussing the lack of attention 
courts have given to the first prong of Katz). 
36. David W. Cunis, Note, California v. Greenwood: Discarding the 
Traditional Approach to the Search and Seizure of Garbage, 38 Cath. 
U. L. Rev. 543, 565 (1989).  
37. E.g., Patriots Cheerleader Fired After Facebook Swastika Photo, Fox 
News (Nov. 6, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/11/06/patri
ots-cheerleader-fired-after-facebook-swastika-photo/; Bloomberg News, 
Facebook Chat Gets 13 Virgin Airlines Employees Fired, N.Y. Daily 
News (Nov. 1, 2008, 8:12 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/mo
ney/facebook-chat-13-virgin-airlines-employees-fired-article-1.335199.  
38. Thirty-Seven Percent of Companies Use Social Networks to Research 
Potential Job Candidates, According to New CareerBuilder Survey, 
CareerBuilder (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.careerbuilder.com/share/
aboutus/pressreleasesdetail.aspx?id=pr691&sd=4%2f18%2f2012&ed=4%
2f18%2f2099. 
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on information found online.39 Although such evaluations are typically 
done through Internet searches or mutual friends, in some cases 
employers and universities demand Facebook passwords from current 
or prospective employees and students, a practice that, despite 
controversy, remains legal in the majority of United States.40 On the 
other hand, evading this scrutiny by restricting access to or removing 
personal information from Facebook may also hurt one’s job 
prospects.41 In addition, Facebook is monitored by intelligence42 and 
law enforcement agencies.43 
Following California v. Greenwood,44 in which the Supreme Court 
determined that material left outdoors in trash bags was accessible to 
the public and thus could not reasonably be expected to be private,45 
the Supreme Court has tended to find it reasonable to expect privacy 
only in acts or spaces unobservable to the general public.46 As shown 
by Facebook, however, the evolution and mass adoption of new 
communications and other technologies tends over time to increase 
the public visibility of acts people consider private. The Supreme 
Court has in effect held in recent rulings such as Dow Chemical Co. v. 
United States47 that “the effect of modern life, with its technological 
and other advances, serves to eliminate or reduce a person’s justified 
expectation of privacy.”48 Along these lines, Helen Nissenbaum notes  
39. Laura Vanderkam, How Social Media Can Affect Your Job Search, 
CNN (Oct. 9, 2012, 9:56 AM) http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/09/living/
real-simple-social-media-job/index.html.  
40. Jonathan Dame, Will Employers Still Ask for Facebook Passwords in 
2014?, USA Today (Jan. 10, 2014, 2:03 AM), http://www.usatoday.co
m/story/money/business/2014/01/10/facebook-passwords-employers/ 
4327739/. 
41. Jade Pech, Social Networking Sites and Selection Decisions: The Impact 
of Privacy Settings of Facebook Profiles on Hiring (June 11, 2013) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Central Oklahoma), available at 
UMI Dissertation Publishing 1543734. 
42. Kimberly Dozier, AP Exclusive: CIA following Twitter, Facebook, El 
Paso Times (Jan. 4, 2011, 9:45 AM), http://www.elpasotimes.com/new
updated/ci_19264270. 
43. Sean Gallagher, Staking Out Twitter and Facebook, New Service Lets 
Police Poke Perps, Ars Technica (Nov. 13, 2013, 6:25 PM), http://ars
technica.com/information-technology/2013/11/staking-out-twitter-and-
facebook-new-service-lets-police-poke-perps/. 
44.    486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
45. Id. at 40. 
46. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: 
Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 307, 316–20 
(1998). 
47. 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
48. Clancy, supra note 46, at 335. 
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that the “expectation of privacy” test prevents the Court from ruling 
against the increasingly prominent practices of public surveillance, 
which include searching online public records, consumer profiling, 
data mining, and the use of location technologies such as radio 
frequency identification (RFID). This is because the test defines 
movement or activity in public arenas as “implicitly” abandoning 
“any expectation of privacy.”49 Nissenbaum views this as evidence 
that “traditional theoretical insights” yield unsatisfactory conclusions 
in the case of public surveillance.50  
VII. Katz Is Undercut by the Third Party Doctrine 
Katz is further damaged by the combination of recent 
technological developments with the “third party doctrine.” As stated 
in United States v. Miller,51 this doctrine asserts that the “Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed 
to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities” 
and that “issuance of a subpoena to a third party does not violate the 
rights of a defendant.”52 While originally justifying the police 
subpoena of a suspect’s bank records, the third party doctrine has 
since become a serious impediment to Fourth Amendment restrictions 
on new surveillance technologies due to the essential role third parties 
play over the Internet. As a result, argues Stephen Henderson, the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test in its current form threatens 
to “render the Fourth Amendment a practical nullity.”53 Whereas the 
Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for surveillance of personal 
paper mail, for example, the third party doctrine leaves e-mail 
without similar protection.54 This impelled Congress to legislate 
protection for e-mail with the 1986 Stored Communications Act,55 but 
 
49. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 
119, 135 (2004). 
50. Id. at 119. 
51. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
52. Id. at 443, 444. 
53. Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically 
Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 Mercer L. Rev. 
507, 510 (2005). 
54. See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, 
https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/contactUs/faq.aspx (last visited Oct. 
19, 2014) (“First-Class letters and parcels . . . cannot be opened without 
a search warrant.”). 
55. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006).  
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advances in technology quickly rendered that law obsolete.56 Likewise, 
Peter Swire warns that increasing use of the Internet, and thus third 
parties, to conduct phone calls may render the “expectation of 
privacy” test ineffective even for phone call wiretapping—the original 
subject of the Katz ruling.57 In today’s era of “big data,” which Craig 
Mundie points out is characterized by the “widespread and perpetual 
collection and storage” of personal information by third parties58 and 
in which individuals and businesses increasingly store information “in 
the cloud” rather than on their own devices, a traditional privacy 
paradigm based on secrecy is no longer relevant or useful. Several 
Supreme Court justices have acknowledged this flaw in Katz 
jurisprudence.59  
VIII. Katz Stays Home 
Katz will be mourned much less than one might have expected 
given the excitement with which its arrival was greeted. At the time, 
Katz was said to be a “revolution”60 and a “watershed in [F]ourth 
[A]mendment jurisprudence,”61 and consensus quickly emerged that it 
was a “landmark decision that dramatically changed Fourth 
Amendment law.”62 This was, at least in part, because prior to Katz 
the boundary between that which was private (in the Fourth 
Amendment sense, requiring a warrant to be searched) and that 
which was not was largely based on the legal concept that one’s home 
 
56. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1208 
(2004). 
57. Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live Katz., 102 Mich. L. Rev. 904, 
910–12 (2004). 
58. Craig Mundie, Privacy Pragmatism: Focus on Data Use, Not Data 
Collection, Foreign Aff., March/April 2014, at 28, 28.  
59. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “unless a person is prepared to forgo . . . personal 
or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance 
[by third parties],” which is of less relevance to privacy than “the risks he 
should be forced to assume in a free and open society”); see also United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the third party doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age”).  
60. James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an 
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 
Hastings L.J. 645, 649 (1985); Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the 
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 
40 Vand. L. Rev. 1077, 1087 (1987). 
61. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 382. 
62. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitu-
tional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 820 (2004).  
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was one’s castle, while that which was out in public was fair game for 
the state. (This notion was explicated in the third party doctrine.) 
Katz was held to have redefined this boundary such that, in the words 
of the majority opinion of the Court, that which a person “seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,” is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, whereas that which “a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is 
not.”63 Yet the assertion that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places” did not create the expected privacy bubble that 
accompanies a person wherever she or he went.64 In an important 
qualification, Justice Harlan noted from the onset that “what 
protection [the Fourth Amendment] affords to those people . . . re-
quires reference to a ‘place.’”65 
Most importantly, as Katz was used as a precedent in case after 
case that followed, time and time again the courts recognized a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when the intrusions concerned the 
home—but not when the person or their communications were in 
public spaces, in effect reintroducing the property-based definition of 
privacy through a back door! As Daniel Pesciotta points out, the 
Supreme Court used Katz to maintain “steadfast support of citizens’ 
privacy rights in the most private of all places—the home.”66 In the 
Katz ruling itself, the argument that Katz had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a phone booth hinged on the fact that he 
“occupie[d]” the phone booth and “[shut] the door behind him.”67 
According to Justice Harlan, this made the phone booth a 
“temporarily private place,” raising an implicit comparison to the only 
permanently private place: the home.68 In United States v. Karo,69 the 
Court justified denying the use of a tracking device within a house on 
the “basic Fourth Amendment principle” that “private residences are 
places in which the individual normally expects privacy.”70 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Kyllo v. United States,71 which 
denied the use of infrared technology to evaluate the contents of a 
house, made the case for a return to the home even more strongly. 
 
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967). 
64. Id. at 351.  
65. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
66. Daniel T. Pesciotta, Note, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth 
Amendment in the 21st Century, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187, 243 (2012). 
67. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (majority opinion). 
68.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).     
69. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).   
70. Id. at 714.  
71. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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Justice Scalia stated that the “right of a man to retreat into his own 
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion” 
forms “the very core”72 of the Fourth Amendment, which “draws a 
firm line at the entrance of the house”73 based on “roots deep in the 
common law” that reveal the “minimal expectation of privacy.”74  
In the same post-Katz period, cases dealing with surveillance 
technology outside the home have rarely favored privacy interests. 
Such cases include Smith v. Maryland,75 which held there was no 
“expectation of privacy” for lists of phone numbers dialed;76 United 
States v. Knotts,77 which allowed the use of a tracking device in 
public;78 and California v. Ciraolo79 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United 
States,80 which allowed aerial surveillance of a backyard81 and a 
chemical plant,82 respectively. 
Some legal scholars find some support for the transformative view 
of Katz in the Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in United States v. 
Jones,83 the first Fourth Amendment technology case in a decade.84 
They cite this case as revealing Katz’s potential to reconcile 
technology and privacy by protecting “a defendant’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights in his public movements.”85 However, the majority in 
Jones held that a GPS device surreptitiously attached to a suspect’s 
vehicle violated his privacy rights based on the pre-Katz86 “property-
based approach” of a “common-law trespassory test” rather than the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test.87  
 
72. Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).  
73. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).  
74. Id. at 34. 
75. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
76.  Id. at 742. 
77.   460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
78. Id. at 285. 
79. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
80. 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
81. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214. 
82. Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 232. 
83.  132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
84. E.g., Pesciotta, supra note 66, at 230 (noting that the Court took a “more 
than ten-year hiatus from deciding a Fourth Amendment case involving 
technology”). 
85. Id. at 244. 
86. Id. at 210 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–52). 
87. Id.; Sherry F. Colb, The Supreme Court Decides the GPS Case, United 
States v. Jones, and the Fourth Amendment Evolves: Part One in a 
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In fact, a close reading of the Jones ruling reveals that the Court 
agreed on the drawbacks of the “reasonable expectations” test. Justice 
Alito’s concurrence, backed by three other justices, spends several 
paragraphs discussing Katz’s flaws, including its “circularity,” its 
subjectivity, and especially the erosion of privacy expectations in the 
face of technology.88 Justice Sotomayor’s own concurrence goes even 
further, taking the opportunity to criticize the third-party doctrine as 
“ill suited to the digital age” despite the lack of third parties in the 
actual case at hand.89 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion sidesteps these 
issues by resurrecting the property-based standard and treating the 
vehicle in question as akin to a home because trespassing, a term 
usually used for homes, and here applied to a person’s car, was 
involved.90 Alito’s concurrence criticizes Scalia’s application of “18th-
century tort law” as unsuited to “21st-century surveillance,” pointing 
out the ruling’s “[d]isharmony with a substantial body of existing case 
law,” emphasis on the “trivial” matter of a physical device rather 
than the central issue of privacy, and irrelevance to non–physically 
intrusive electronic surveillance.91 Scalia responds to this criticism by 
warning that relying “exclusively” on Katz “eliminates rights that 
previously existed.”92  
The issue stands out if one puts aside for a moment the language 
of legal discourse, going beyond “this court stated” vs. “this court 
ruled,” and examines it in layperson’s terms. Compare two situations: 
In the first, the government suspects that a person is illegally growing 
marijuana in his home, but the suspicion does not rise to the level 
that would convince a judge to grant a warrant. How much violation 
of privacy occurs if the government uses a thermal device to find out 
the temperature in that home’s den—and it turns out that the person 
was innocent, cooking nothing more than dinner? Or consider a police 
dog trained to detect bombs and contraband that approaches the 
home from a side most visitors do not. The Court has ruled that both 
cases are intrusions on the home and thus violate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Now, compare these to a situation in which 
cameras follow a person every place they go in public, all day and all 
night—to bars, clinics, Alcoholics Anonymous sessions, political 
meetings, rendezvous with a lover—and collect and analyze all this 
 
Two-Part Series of Columns, Justia (Feb. 28, 2012), http://verdict. 
justia.com/2012/02/08/the-supreme-court-decides-the-gps-case-united-
states-v-jones-and-the-fourth-amendment-evolves. 
88. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
89. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
90. Id. at 949–50 (majority opinion). 
91. Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring). 
92. Id. at 953 (majority opinion). 
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information to make it available to the government. Such systems are 
not science fiction but rather are an increasing reality in major U.S. 
cities; notable examples include Persistent Security Systems93 and 
Microsoft’s Domain Awareness System.94 Or consider the use of para-
bolic microphones to eavesdrop on private conversations in a public 
area such as a park. If one accepts the principle that some privacy 
should exist even in public areas, these modes of surveillance repre-
sent much broader, deeper, and more indiscriminate violations of 
privacy than the limited and situational intrusions of a drug-sniffing 
dog or an infrared scanner penetrating the home.  
In short, Katz took the U.S. no more than, at best, a baby step 
toward privacy protection outside the home. It excessively privileges 
the home, while that which the U.S. needs is a doctrine of privacy 
that protects privacy in both realms against unreasonable search and 
seizure. A psychologist may argue that the legal community is holding 
on to Katz because it does not want to regress to the property-based, 
home-centered privacy doctrine—but in effect Katz does little to move 
the protection of privacy beyond the home’s walls. The time has come 
to develop a cyber-age privacy doctrine that focuses on secondary use 
rather than on primary collection of personal information, a subject 
that deserves a separate treatment.95 
 
 
93. Craig Timberg, High Above, an All-Seeing Eye Watches for Crime, 
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